e-Voting Recount Tips

The below How-To list was sent on February 18th to some election activists who want to post a general How-To manual for citizens.

These tips apply to “recounting” a voter verified paper audit trail, but many ideas transfer over to a recount actual paper ballots marked by voters.

Registration List

In advance of an anticipated recount, request the list of registered voters for that county, for the period after registration closed and before the election. (If your election district allows same-day registration, request the final list as created on Election Day.)

For longer term activists, request the list of registered voters several months in advance of the November election, as well. Request the lists at two or three points throughout the year to study purge patterns (where election officials remove voters from the rolls).

How is the selection of precincts to be determined? Is this a random selection? If so, describe how the precincts to be recounted were randomly selected. Did you observe this process or was it done out of your sight? Note this in your report.

Some recounts may target specific precincts to be recounted, at the discretion of the contestant. Find out the criteria for how these targeted precincts were selected (if possible) and note that in your report.

Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail a.k.a. Real Time Audit Log

What is being “recounted” is the voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), also known as the Real Time Audit Log (RTAL). This intact singular roll of paper shows:

when the machine was turned on (date and time),
the results of the Audit and Logic tests,
any “password overrides” and other messages produced throughout the day,
the actual ballot choices of each individual voter, in the order voted,
when they “closed out the machine” and
totals of that machine for the day are printed.

This singular intact roll of paper – that can be 300 feet long – will also record “service menu entered” or other indication of technician involvement.

There is one VVPAT per machine, but there can be several machines per precinct.

Create Your Recount Form in Advance

Bring pre-printed forms on which to note specific data and vote totals. These forms are where your totals are recorded, and are separate from your tally sheets.

Touchscreens that use a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), sometimes called a real time audit log (RTAL), produce a thermal paper roll that can be up to 300 feet long. This records all the ballot selections by each voter who voted on that particular machine. Be sure you are close enough to read it, as the print is very tiny. Look for and note:

Precinct number

Date of recount

Names of all present (and their position, if officials)

Machine number (there may be from one to several machines per precinct). On an ES&S iVotronic touch screen system, also note:

· Does the “public count” read zero at the beginning of the tape
· Note the “protective” or “protected” count at the beginning of the tape
· Note the “protective” or “protected” count at the end of the tape
· Note the number of “coded ballots” also known a provisional votes

Candidate names, with space for

· Number of in-person votes
· Number of provisional votes (or “coded” ballots)
· Number of undervotes

Is the VVPAT torn or incomplete? Has it been taped? Is it written on? Below is a list of problems previously observed on an ES&S iVotronic touch screen:

· paper jams
· no vote recorded (tape says “not opened”)
· not used (reported by Board of Elections)
· one vote recorded
· torn tapes
· “PEB not accessed” (Precinct Electronic Ballot is plugged into each machine for that precinct and downloads the vote totals)
· blank roll of paper
· roll reversed (which means the roll has been viewed, and rewound backwards)
· rolls are not signed and dated by pollworkers
· password override message

Look for computer generated warnings that are printed on the VVPAT which indicate the machine was accessed during Election Day, a password was changed, machine improperly shut down, etc. Photocopy or photograph these VVPATs, or if that is not possible, write down the entire warning message.

Is there a large space between voters? The spacing should be even between voters. Note which machine exhibits this on its roll, and how often it occurs on a given roll.

Note unusual voting patters of a given voter. For example, in the November 2006 recount in Franklin County, Ohio, one ballot I observed showed a vote for Green Party candidate, Bob Fitrakis, for governor, all other selections were for Democrats, and for the hotly contested U.S. Congressional seat, the voter supposedly chose conservative Republican Deborah Pryce.

Tally Sheets – Use Lined Paper

Two tally methods are offered:

Hash marks of four //// can be crossed with diagonal hash mark so that each block of hash marks represents 5 votes, making it easy to total by counting by five.

The dot tally method uses far less space, and gives blocks of 10, which is even easier to total than blocks of five. This is a preferred method when counting large numbers of objects like ballots, but it does take a little explanation.

Mark a dot in each corner of a square (that would be four votes). Connect the dots to form the square (another four votes). Put an X thru the middle of the square (another two votes).
This represents ten votes:

Each dot or line represents one vote:
[ dot tally pictures did not transfer into this post]

In less space than it takes to make five hash marks, a block of ten is recorded using the dot tally method, and it is much neater and thus easier to count correctly.

Tally Order

Richard Hayes Phillips suggests the following order of tallying, which will expose ballot tampering (high number of consecutive ballots for the same candidate).

Using lined paper for your tally sheets, write the name of the candidate first called out and give that vote a hash mark (or a dot, if using the dot tally method). Continue recording consecutive candidate choices on the same line (and continuing onto the next line if necessary).

When a different candidate name is called out, write that candidate’s name on the next line and begin marking. Again, continue recording consecutive candidate choices on the same line.

Repeat this process throughout. When finished, you should be able to visually ascertain if an unusually high number of consecutive votes for a particular candidate occurred.

Signature Audit

(I have a couple pages of tips, but I have to distill this from a 10-page report. I’ll wait to see if you want this level of detail.)