Sunday, March 9, 2008

Inherent Uncertainty and NH's Primary Results

January 9, 2008 Inherent Uncertainty and NH's Primary Results


“I don’t trust in your statistics; I ain’t got no crystal ball. If I had a million dollars, well, I’d, I’d spend it all to Hand Count Paper Ballots. Toss those vote machines away. Pay my neighbors to guard the ballot box all day…” Santeria Ballots (with much apology to Sublime).


Blogs are bursting over the fact that ALL the major pollsters, including Hillary’s and Barack’s internal polling, had Obama winning New Hampshire’s presidential primary election.

Yet in a surreal recurring nightmare, official results say otherwise.

Votes that are recorded and counted in secret only and always produce inherent uncertainty. There’s no way around it. It’s why election experts from around the globe, when describing democratic elections, call for a secret vote and a transparent vote count.

Specifically as to vote counting, Goodwin-Gill notes in Free and Fair Elections,
“votes are tallied in a process that inspires confidence in the electorate.” (p.152)

But with an ever-expanding mountain of scientific condemnation of software-driven election systems, there is no basis for confidence in results from software-driven machines.

Because 1/5 of New Hampshire’s ballots are counted by hand, we can compare results from hand-counted precincts with computerized results. Lori Price, of Citizens for Legitimate Government, produced that comparison, which shows that in hand-counted precincts, Barack Obama beat Hillary Clinton 39-35%. Ron Paul’s War Room is questioning the results in this 6-minute video, asking for a hand count.

Bob Koehler (Tribune Media Services) writes:

The fact is, whatever actually happened in New Hampshire voting booths on Tuesday, our elections are horrifically insecure. For instance, Bev Harris, of the highly respected voting watchdog organization Black Box Voting, recently wrote that the Diebold 1.94w optical scan machines used by 80% of New Hampshire’s voters are "the exact same make, model and version hacked in the Black Box Voting project in Leon County (Florida)" a few years ago. They haven't
been upgraded; the security problems haven't been fixed.
This 10-minute video shows LHS’s president lying about the fixes to these optical scans, and it shows how easily optical scan machines can thwart the authentic vote.

Bev Harris reports:

LHS Associates programs every single voting machine in New Hampshire, Connecticut, almost all of Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine.

But did state officials in five New England states ever do a criminal background check on this company's executives? Do the laws of these five states even ALLOW them to hire convicted criminals for services paid for by the state? What about over 500 local towns and municipalities?

According to my sources, LHS Marketing and Sales Director Kenneth Hajjar … pled guilty to "sale / CND" and was sentenced to 12 months in the Rockingham County Correctional facility, and fined $2000. As things go for the politically connected, he was then given a deferred sentence and $1000 of his fine was suspended.

Hajjar doesn't limit his involvement in the voting machine business to
sales. According to an interview conducted by Brad Friedman, Hajjar totes memory cards around in the trunk of his car and defends the boggling concept of swapping out memory cards during the middle of elections.


Nancy Tobi, of Democracy for New Hampshire, notes in an email:
We do have a lot of questions. But we will never have answers as long as we have privatized secret vote counting. The questions are out there and maybe eventually will cause enough people to want to stop asking the questions and get rid of corporate-run elections.
Why do the powers-that-be insist we use hackable voting machines? When experts tell us that optical scan systems are just as hackable as touch-screen systems, why is anyone using either? Why invoke inherent uncertainty in reported results?

Dave Berman describes this idea in two ways:

[W]e have the intentional creation and perpetuation of inherent uncertainty. It serves the power structure to keep the masses divided. Wedge issues are just the most superficial and obvious ways. More insidious and apparently not as easy to recognize is the rift in the perception of reality created by inherent uncertainty.

He explains further, in tonight’s email to me:
I think inherent uncertainty is intentionally created through various means including sheer laziness and false balance, but also in situations where "truth" can never really be known - secret vote counting, for example. Whatever is published is presented as if it were a certain fact….

Leaving it to the media consumer to decide also facilitates a rift in the
perception of reality. This is the linchpin of it all, since matters of fact are forcibly devolved into differences of opinion that can never be resolved (since we can never know the true outcome of any election counted in secret).

Instead of fighting about who was right, the pollsters or the machines, we are better served by removing machines from public elections and reaching conclusive outcomes - results that can be repeatedly verified by anyone.

We do this by upgrading to hand-counted paper ballots at the precinct, on election night, before all who wish to observe. Results are then posted at the precinct for all to verify.

There are several hundred precincts in the nation that still hand count paper ballots, on election night. It takes 4-5 hours, depending on the number of counting teams. It’s done at the precinct level, which handles about 1,000 registered voters. A fresh team of counters can be pooled from the list of registered voters, and the audit verification is part of the hand-counting process.

Hand-counting is simple – we’ve been doing it for over 125 years on a mass scale. It’s the least expensive, and the easiest to secure from fraud. It is a “high order civic duty” according to Sally Castleman, Executive Director of Election Defense Alliance.

Transparent vote counting will yield inherent certainty, since any group of people can count the voter-prepared ballots to arrive at the same conclusive outcomes. This is what we deserve and demand.

Call or write your representative and demand these machines be banned from use in the United States. Stand up for transparent vote counting that leads to conclusive results. Stand up for democracy. Do it now.

Writers Campaign for Transparent Vote Counting

January 10, 2008 Writers Campaign for Transparent Vote Counting

This collection of articles on New Hampshire's disparity between hand-counted precincts and machine-tabulated precincts contain a wealth of resource and video links from most of the biggest names in election integrity. The best and the brightest have written with persuasion, arguing for transparency. Most articles contain action links, to write Congress and newspapers. Spread the word.
###

For any who missed this collection of articles on NH’s disparity between hand-counted precincts and machine-tabulated precincts, these articles contain a wealth of resource and video links from most of the biggest names in election integrity. The best and the brightest have written with persuasion, arguing for transparency.

Rob Kall and Joan Brunwasser of OpEdNews.com organized a writer’s campaign, so most of these articles (except the last few) contain action links that allow you to draft a letter to your local newspaper or to Congress. OpEdNews will send the letter for you.

The only way we will have a reliable vote count is if we count the ballots ourselves. EDA is taking the Humboldt County Voter Confidence Committee’s idea and organizing a national list of willing hand counters. See the “I COUNT” article by Andi Novick and Sally Castleman to sign up.

As Rob points out, Super Tuesday is just around the corner. Citizens who face the threat to our democracy wrought by secret vote counting will be those who use these action articles to write their members of Congress, and/or their local newspapers. Or, they're already organizing their own campaigns for election integrity or justice.

Spread the word. Maybe one or more of these articles will inspire citizens to stand up for transparent vote counting, a basic tenet of democratic elections.
~ Rady

Do New Hampshire Vote Count Questions Harbinger Super Tuesday Vote Theft Disaster?by Rob Kall
We were warned that there could be problems with vote counts, because of e-voting vulnerabilities. The warnings came true. And now, we face a disastrous set of e-vote rigging risks on Super Tuesday.

Before the New Hampshire primaries we were warned:

By Nancy Tobi: NH: NH: "First in the nation" (with corporate controlled secret vote counting)

By Michael Collins: ALL Diebold ALL the Time - It's the New Hampshire Primary

By Bev Harris: The Cat That Controls New Hampshire Election Programming

Oh, no, the mainstream/corpsestream media didn’t say a word. The Democratic party didn’t mention it. They’re afraid to dampen voter turnout. But we sure covered it. Thers were headlined stories.

We expected vote count problems. And lo and behold, when the word came in that there were huge discrepancies between electronic and paper ballot records, we were not surprised. And the corpsestream media failed to cover the story.

Sure, they asked questions, “Why did the pollsters fail?” They even convened special discussions, unfortunately, using the regular pundits. And of course, nothing was mentioned of the data that explained WHY THE POLLS FAILED.

It didn’t’ take long for the reports to come in and for our writers to report on them. As soon as the first one came in, I decided to jump on this—that it was a major, important story that I knew the mainstream media would pass on, even though, just this past weekend, the NY Times did a major article on it in its magazine.

I contacted our voting integrity editor, Joan Brunwasser and asked her to put out the word to our team of voting integrity writers and activists. We put a 12 noon Thursday deadline on the articles. OpEdNews is generally a volunteer site. Writers submit articles they’ve written. They don’t do articles on assignment and they don’t do them with deadlines.

So this is something new. We put the deadline on it because the freshness of the New Hampshire story would quickly be lost in the news cycle.

The word went out and the stories started to come in. Here they are:

The Surprising Democratic Primary Results in New Hampshire By Pokey Anderson. The pundits speak for themselves and the NH results. [Live broadcast, evening of January 8, 2008, New Hampshire Public Radio. NHPR comments are notes ...

Primary Concerns By Bob Koehler. No one wants to risk spoiling the fun of primary season with downer news about voting machine insecurity. If only red flags were considered patriotic.

Obama-Clinton: Opscan v. Handcount Results By Bruce O'Dell. Based on the official results on the New Hampshire Secretary of state web site, there is a remarkable relationship between Obama and Clinton votes, wh...

In the Meantime, in Between Time, Ain’t We Got Fun? By Michael Green. The New Hampshire Primary is a straightforward fraud in which electronic voting machines were programmed to shift votes away from Barak Obama and add ...

"Hey Ron Paul, I'm in your primary stealing your votez" By Amy Demiceli. Not even twenty four hours passed before reports of fraud surfaced in New Hampshire, it began in the town of Sutton. Initially the reports released sa...

Alarms Should Go Off Whenever the Discrepancies Between the "Official" Results and the Polls Can't Be Explained By Andi Novick. In all other countries we understand that when the "official" results are so different from the polling results, the "official" results must be questi...

Inherent Uncertainty and NH’s Primary Results By Rady Ananda. Blogs are bursting over the fact that ALL the major pollsters, including Hillary's and Barack's internal polling, had Obama winning New Hampshire's primary. We’ll never know because software driven devices invoke inherent uncertainty.

Criminal Record Of Kenneth Hajjar- New England Voting Machine Firm ExecBy Bev Harris. They program every single voting machine in New Hampshire, Connecticut, almost all of Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine. But did state officials in fi...

How John Edwards Can (Still) Win the NH Primary By Emily Levy. Questions about the accuracy of the New Hampshire Democratic Primary election results provide a perfect opportunity for Democratic presidential candid...

Getting the Framing on Election Polling Right By Mary Howe Kiraly. Polling, especially exit polling, is a well-recognized science. Computerized voting, on the other hand, is vulnerable to human error,programming error,and ...

New Hampshire Election Fraud By Ron Corvus. New Hampshire Election Fraud: Hillary LOST the paper ballot count but WON the optical scan ballot count. Obama WON the paper ballot count but LOST the...

99 Ways to Steal Elections: The Story of John Fund and Ron Paul by Melinda Pillsbury-Foster. We need a Ballot Bomb to pay for a Whistle Blower: $1,000,000.00 will loosen a lot of lips. This way we can make all the Greedy, corporate, pundits, think tanks, and greed candidates cry.

Clinton Tainted Victory In New Hampshire By Allen L Roland. Voting irregularities in New Hampshire point not only to the previously discredited Diebold Accuvote optical scan but to the distinct possibility that...

Sign Up To Take Back Our Elections – The "I Count" Corps By Andi Novick and Sally Castleman. It is time for us to take back control of our elections. Machines have shown themselves to be unreliable and vulnerable to tampering. The unexplainable discrepancies between polling and the official count have only risen in proportion to the use of computers in our elections.

New Hampshire Vote Results – Are They For Real? By Jean Hay Bright. Things don't add up in New Hampshire. I cast my vote for a recount.

Can You Spell Deep Trouble? By James Strait If you have even the slightest interest in voting integrity.....well, The CITIZENS of New York State are in the tall grass without a lawn mower. All while the bureaucrats twiddle their pudgy little thumbs.

Votergate Redux 2008: A Look At The Exit Polls By S.Drobny This is what I wrote in OpEdNews in 11/04 and was picked up by my friend John Zogby. Votergate 2004: We Don't Need Paper to Prove Fraud, But We Do Need Money and Leadership, NOW.

Fraud US-Style: Fake Videos and Elections By Stephen Lendman. More evidence showing official news reports can't be trusted.

99 Ways To Steal Elections: The Story of John Fund and Ron Paul By Melinda Pillsbury-Foster. We need a Ballot Bomb to pay for a Whistle Blower: $1,000,000.00 will loosen a lot of lips. This way we can make all the Greedy, corporate, pundits, think tanks, and greed candidates cry.

(Rob continues:)

Now, the problem is not just with New Hampshire. The terrifying threat is Super Tuesday. With so many states running primaries on February 5th, there is a frightening likelihood, given recent history, that more vote count abuse will take place.

Maybe there’s a reason the Democrats have failed miserably at passing legislation to make voting safe, verifiable, reliable and trustworthy. Maybe they feel they can use the vulnerabilities of the system to meet their own interests. It is too late to do serious correction to the problems. But, at the least, congress could pass legislation requiring any voter who chooses to do so to use a paper ballot to vote on.

At the least, primary candidates, particularly democratic candidates, since the Dems have a history of failing to challenge vote rigging, should declare ahead of time and promise that they will look at vote rigging issues and demand recounts if questions arise. The risk on February 5th that some vote count corruption will occur is huge.

What can you do? Tell your federal legislators to do something already. Contact your local daily paper and ask them to cover this issue. It’s a new story, a new angle—potential vote rigging on Super Tuesday!.

Contact your favorite mainstream media—CNN, MSNBC, Faux News, NY Times, USA Today, Washington Post, LA Times, Chicago Tribune, Al Jazeera, the Guardian… and then tell your favorite left wing news publishing sites too—Salon, Huffington Post, Village Voice, Raw Story, Alternet, TalkingPoints memo, The Nation, Counterpunch, Truthout, Think Progress, Buzzflash, SmirkingChimp, TomPaine, InformationClearinghouse.

Tell them to reprint articles, aggregate articles, ask their writers to write articles. Contact your favorite TV hosts—Keith Olbermann, Bill Moyers, Wolf Blitzer, Jack Caffrey, Bill O’Reilly (not,) Joe Scarborough, Chris Matthews, Tim Russert. Tell them to cover this issue. Ask them why, when they explore what went wrong with the polls in New Hampshire, they failed to talk about e-vote problems, about the one man who has his hand in over 80% of NH vote counts.

It is shameful that the Dems have failed to pass legislation that protects the trustworthiness of the vote. Time is short. Already, the failure to pass legislation has introduced doubt and mistrust into our primaries. It is time to end this embarassing phase in the history of democracy.

Tell your legislators, your local media to deal with this firmly and finally, so Americans no longer have to worry about the trustworthiness of the election system.

No Centralized Voter Registration Databases

Originally posted on January 30, 2008 at No Centralized Voter Registration Databases


Computer systems are hackable, from the Department of Homeland Security, to the Pentagon, to local County and City levels.

Franklin County (OH) Muncipal Court is another in a long line of government organizations that violate citizens’ privacy by exposing personal information on their websites.

The Constitutional framers had it right:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.

Some counties recognize this.

See County Web Site Helped Thieves Steal Identities of Victims in Five States for details of Franklin County's disastrous failures. Some of the article is excerpted below:

Police in Worthington Ohio say hundreds of people in five states are the latest victims of identity theft that has resulted from county officials publishing sensitive information about citizens over the Internet. They've asked the U.S. Secret Service to investigate the link between the county Web site and online identity theft.

The known victims of this latest breach are from Ohio, South Carolina, Kentucky, Texas and Wyoming. Although no one has been arrested yet, Worthington police seized the records and computers of two people, who implicated four others and the county Web site in the scheme.

Ohio law requires that some court records are made public but does not require officials to publish any of the records online where the information can be used by criminals worldwide.

Now that the county has published your sensitive information online, local officials say they will try to locate anyone affected by the breach, but place the burden on individuals to take steps to protect themselves. They suggest verifying information in credit reports and keeping constant vigilance over your account.

Better to keep constant vigilance over the Bill of Rights and government officials.

The Help America Vote Act – pushed thru Congress by convicted felon Bob Ney* – requires states to develop and maintain centralized, computerized voter registration databases.

This is one of a series of Congressional Acts since 2001 that strip Americans of their basic rights under the U.S. Constitution. Under HAVA, $3.9 billion was provided to states to deploy hackable computerized voting systems which obscure the vote count from the public.

How convenient for dishonest government officials and hackers. The Big Brother scheme provides name, address, party affiliation, and vote frequency of every registered voter.

Coupling centralized, computerized voter registration databases with secret vote counting (via machine) is a perfect recipe for tyranny. Stalin must be dancing in his grave over U.S. elections.


*Ney's felony conviction means he can no longer vote, which is perfect karma for his part in HAVA.

NOTE: The post below, "Real Election Madness," was originally posted on February 26, 2008.

Real Election Madness

A new book is coming out detailing the efforts of ordinary citizens who investigated the implausible results from the 2004 presidential election held in Ohio. Richard Hayes Phillips promises an advance copy here.

Serving as one of the Ohio investigators taught me that citizen oversight is the cure to "Election Madness," a pandemic delusion fiercely held by half the country - that half that still votes. Some of the symptoms include the belief that honest elections can exist even though:

* Votes are counted in secret (inside a machine);

* The government - whose seats are being challenged - counts the public vote;

* Electoral management bodies (EMBs) repeatedly fail to maintain chain of custody;

* Exit polls that differ from reported results are explained away by corporate media which owns mass media;

* A posture of arrogance and secrecy pervades EMBs toward the public, which is the rightful owner of the election process;

* Recounts are impossible (paperless voting) or sabotaged by EMB failure to maintain secure protocols over the ballots, or conflicting results fail to overturn originally posted official results;

* Centralizing the vote count defeats a precinct-by-precinct check on official results;

* Vote by mail, early voting, and other "convenience voting" methods defeat chain of custody, providing us with no rational basis for confidence in reported results;

* Registration is used by partisans and election officials to disenfranchise voters, thru purges, "glitches" and targeted populations;

* Redistricting is used by partisans and election officials to "choose the voters" instead of the other way around;

* Through rules, rulings, and laws, citizens are presented with no significant difference between candidates offered in the dominant "two-party" system;

* Granting of "personhood" to corporations has monetarily corrupted democracy from a "one adult - one vote" proposition to "one dollar - one vote" ...

Truly, this list goes on.

As more and more citizens become involved in electoral management oversight, we have a chance at reviving democracy in the U.S.

Investigate, observe, count signatures, count ballots, and follow the chain of custody. Video as much of the process as possible, make movies, and write books, blogs and editorials. Where election officials fail in their duties, report this as widely as possible, in as many venues as possible.

Let's take our country back, by implementing an election process that models best management practices. This brief handbook offers a skeletal plan on how to do this. A lengthier handbook is in the works.

Sort and Stack Method of Hand Counting Ballots

In a single page, complete and concise instructions are provided for hand counting ballots at http://snipurl.com/21d36

This method requires the use of a Reconciliation Audit Slip, a sample of which is provided at http://snipurl.com/21d39

Sunday, March 2, 2008

Papering over OptiScam Problems

This is my January 6th response (originally posted at OpEdNews.com) to Clive Thompson's piece in the Sunday NYTimes, "Can You Count on These Machines?" reproduced in a separate post below.


In a 7,800-word article in today’s New York Times Sunday Magazine, writer Clive Thompson details the myriad of problems associated with touch screen voting systems and devotes only 3% of his essay to similar problems with optical scan systems. If readers actually make it to the last two paragraphs, they’ll read that optical scans – despite Thompson’s prior promotion of them – are also fraught with vulnerabilities.

In Can You Count on These Machines? Thompson correctly describes how “costs ballooned and chaos reigned when Cuyahoga County, Ohio first used Diebold’s AccuVote touch screen system, but inaccurately low-balls the number of memory cards and cartridges that went “missing” during that May 2006 primary. Thompson fails to mention that twenty-eight $4,500 voting machines also went “missing.”

Because the hired watchdog group (Election Science Institute) randomly selected 10% of the precincts to study, we can extrapolate to determine, with a fair degree of confidence, the total number of missing machines to be 280, and the total number of missing memory cards and cartridges to be 890, for the entire county, for that one election. Thompson reports that 200 cards went missing.

He also failed to report that Deputy Director Michael Vu, who oversaw all these “lost” mission critical assets, later resigned and was hired to run San Diego’s elections. In an unfortunate coincidence, at best, a shipment of memory chips to San Diego went missing last month. After Michael Vu’s dismal and shockingly inept handling of Cuyahoga’s May 2006 primary, that he is allowed to serve in any democratic election further defeats confidence in US electoral management bodies.

Reading Thompson’s piece, many will walk away believing optical scans are the best choice for democratic elections. Damn the science. Damn the cost. Damn the loss of transparency and public accountability. Hey, all technologies have problems.

But the problems inherent in software-driven systems turn insider vote stealing into child’s play. Pokey Anderson of Houston’s radio news show, The Monitor, notes:


While there has always been manipulation in elections, the difference between stealing in a hand-counted paper ballot election and an electronic election is the difference between successfully robbing a convenience store and successfully robbing Fort Knox.

Honest elections are a national security issue; without them we fall under the tyranny of the best thief. Media that continues to obfuscate the truth about software-driven election systems serves tyranny, not democracy.

Election integrity activists have been dealing with this obfuscation for three decades, as detailed in Votescam: The Stealing of America by Jim and Ken Collier (1996).


But Thompson’s recent article takes on particular import now, since New York has been ordered to deploy scientifically-condemned voting systems.


During oral arguments last month in USA vs. NY, Judge Gary Sharpe refused to acknowledge that all software-driven voting machines are vulnerable to being hacked. Todd Valentine represents the New York State Board of Elections and sought to show how none of the machines meet NY standards, at which point Judge Sharpe interrupted:



Sixteen months ago I told you to pick a machine, and here we sit in December, a week before Christmas, and you still haven’t picked a machine.

Maybe Judge Sharpe believes that if corporate media and the judicial system continue to deny the reality that none of these machines provide voters with a basis for confidence in reported results, the scientific community and informed activists will simply go away. Instead, our ranks continue to swell, as more and more citizens – and officials – take note of all the failures in software-driven voting systems.

Thompson accurately notes, at the very end of his article:



Public crises of confidence in voting machines used to come along rarely, every few decades. But now every single election cycle seems to provoke a crisis, a thirst for a new technological fix. The troubles of voting machines may subside as optical scanning comes in, but they’re unlikely to ever go away.

The reason is simple. We need to reject software-driven systems and implement the far cheaper hand-counted paper ballot system. It’s easier to protect from fraud and it provides the transparency that democratic elections demand.

A Pattern of Obfuscation


Back in the ’70s and ’80s, the Collier brothers endured the same media and judicial blackout of this issue when trying to expose these problems. In Votescam, they report that in 1989, the New York Times finally revealed problems associated with computerized vote tabulation:



Some critics of computerized vote counting worry about the potential for ‘trapdoors,’ ‘time bombs,’ and ‘Trojan Horses…’ Once inside the system, (a hacker) could program the computer to count votes for one candidate as votes for another.
In that 1989 New York Times article, Princeton University computer scientist Howard J. Strauss explained:


Writing the ‘source code’ for one of these vote counting
systems, a programmer could insert a ‘Trojan Horse’ that might not appear for years.


Suppose I wanted to throw the 1992 presidential nomination to (Mario Cuomo, for example). I write the code so that every time the name comes up in the primaries, he receives a certain number of votes.


Today’s computer scientists have the same exact criticism for using software in public elections. They take it even further: because there can be a million lines of code, opening up the source code for review in no way guarantees that problems will be discovered.

The 2006 Princeton study of touch screen systems reiterated the same complaints:



Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss.
Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have unsupervised access to the machines.

One has to wonder why the U.S. government would give states $3.9 billion to buy easily compromised voting systems, a vulnerability known for decades.

Expert Studies Condemn Optical Scan Election Systems


Last month, I quoted several computer experts who studied the machines in use today and urge all Americans to read this 20-page summary. By no means do I cover all the reports that have come out in the last ten years, but all experts who study these systems agree: they are subject to easy manipulation. Use your find command to search the annotation for the term, optical scan, and read how optical scan systems also fail democracy.


Also note the paper by Ryan and Hoke that focuses on the GEMS tabulation system which is used in Diebold’s optical scan system. Not only are optical scans vulnerable to hack, but apparently, they were designed that way.


Many people, by now, have heard of California’s Top-To-Bottom Review of Diebold, Hart and Sequoia touch screens and optical scan systems. Cleveland State University Center for Election Integrity Chief, Dr. Candice Hoke, summarized all the findings into a two page document. In a personal email, she wrote:



I was the team leader for the TTBR Diebold Documentation assessment. The TTBR study's lead scientists provided suggestions for this short summary but it is ultimately my work. To reduce over 500 pages to two pages, at least a few
important findings – especially about design flaws not relating to security issues -- had to be sidestepped.

I urge all Americans to read that document, as well. The more each of us grasps the inappropriateness of using such technology in public elections, the quicker we will return to a more secure voting and counting system.

While computer experts continue to detail the myriad ways that software-driven systems can be manipulated, as detailed in my annotation, only some of these technical problems can be addressed by implementing best management practices. Particularly, this includes better training and the employment of expensive experts and expensive chain of custody protocols.


But since the Department of Homeland Security and the Pentagon are unable to keep their systems from being hacked, we can have even less confidence in our electoral management bodies who are paid far less and have a far smaller staff than either federal agency.


Optical Scan Systems Obfuscate the Vote Count


The hackability of software-driven systems is only one reason to reject their use in public elections. More importantly, the use of any machine hides the vote count from the public. Josef Stalin understood this when he said, “It’s not who votes that counts; it’s who counts the vote.”


Free and fair elections, as contemplated by international experts, require a secret vote and a public count. Democratic elections are to be transparent, so that the entire public can have confidence in reported results.


The 2007 Florida study affirmed prior findings that voting on touch screen systems removes voter privacy. With the use of touch screen systems, the vote becomes public and the count becomes secret.
It is somewhat gratifying that the work of thousands of people have finally moved some of our nation’s electoral management bodies to decide that they should reject touch screen voting systems. But this does not go far enough.


When votes are counted on an optical scan system, there is a machine and several experts between the voter and her vote. This expensive overlay obfuscates the vote count and renders its results questionable, at best. Software can be programmed to read the blackened bubbles in a way other than how the voter intended.


We Don’t Need No Stinking Audit


San Diego elections chief has sued the State of California on the grounds that audits are too time-consuming and expensive. This, in a county that sends its voting machines on sleepovers with poll workers weeks in advance of an election.


Anyone who has read any of the scientific studies understands that only a minute of unsupervised access is all that is needed to subvert the integrity of that machine.

But, audits provide false confidence, and should not be relied on for accurate results. Get it right on election night, not days later.

Numerous examples exist – in present day elections – showing how audits reveal outlandish results that the courts allowed to stand.

The most blatant example is the Jennings-Buchanan race in Florida’s District 13 with a whopping 15% undervote rate in one county, when the national average is normally 3% undervotes in a Senate race.


When a team of us counted the signatures in Franklin County’s November 2006 election, fully one-fourth* of all precincts showed that the number of signatures did not match official reports. During the recount, computer scientist Dr. Rebecca Mercuri observed:


In summary, there are numerous reasons why there cannot be confidence in the election process, the recount, and the vote totals for the Franklin County, Ohio November 7, 2006 election. These reasons include:
a) the denial of an appropriate recount from the VVPAT/RTAL materials for the requested precincts;

b) significant evidence that parts of original RTALs and end tally reports were missing;


c) evidence the voting system was inappropriately configured and improperly used during the election;


d) indication that election procedures were violated, including the possibility of password overrides during setup, and use of the machines to cast ballots after RTAL paper supplies has run out;


e) evidence of inappropriate impounding and handling of election materials at the County warehouse following the election, including improper exposure of the VVPAT/RTALs;


f) unexplained disparities between the public counters of ballots cast and the number of voters who signed the poll books in many precincts; and


g) misleading information provided to voters, and not properly followed up by the County, regarding the safety and examination of the voting machines and system.


The judge in that case was unimpressed with these “anomalies” and declared the official results credible. Clearly, audits and recounts are meaningless when it comes to elections.

Election attorney Paul Lehto writes:



I, for one, have never doubted that computers including opti-scan computers CAN COUNT. That's all that the usual "audit" and certainly the usual "recount" ever test for: whether or not there was funky addition in the counts (presuming proper chain of custody between the first count and the audit or recount).

I realize that, as Bev (Harris) points out, a real "audit" would be significantly broader and include the full panoply of chain of custody issues, etc., but in practice as I see it, this broader evaluation either doesn't occur at all because it's not fully mandated, or else problems that DO occur or rather are found by the audit's broader provisions do NOT result in any remedy or result that changes anything or results in any consequences.


Many people feel confident with optical scan systems since they are used in school exams. They fail to recognize, tho, that test results can be directly questioned by a student whose name is on a specific test answer sheet. This is not possible with anonymous ballots.

Trust Has No Place in Public Elections


When Holland computer experts obtained a Nedap-Liberty voting system and proved it could be hacked, the Netherlands rejected that machine and then outlawed such independent tests. Now why would they do that?


When Project EVEREST published its results of Ohio’s voting systems, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner revealed that these vulnerabilities existed in all the systems used in the highly questioned 2004 election.

Bev Harris of Black Box Voting spent 2007 pursuing the Trust Me Election Model and published her shocking findings that pertain to all 50 states. She writes:


The very core of the voting machine controversy is not paper trails or spot check procedures. The essence of whether an election system can be trusted is whether it allows the owners of the government, The People, to view the counting
and the chain of custody. Votes counted in secret, and secret chain of custody can never work unless we change human nature itself…
Those in control of the counting and chain of custody for secret vote counting are the very same public officials caught in financial cheating. And should we really be surprised? Human nature is imperfect. The founders of this nation realized that, and precisely for that reason, envisioned a system based on distrust, not trust.

Hand Count Paper Ballots

The very nature of computers renders them inappropriate for public elections, asserts computer expert Bruce O’Dell. Evidence continues to mount against these machines, optical scan as well as touch screen.
The tried and true method of hand counting the ballots at the precinct on election night is the easiest to secure from fraud, and it allows the public to observe the vote count. Open counts are a necessary facet of elections by the people.


As these truths become more evident to more people, perhaps corporate media outlets will be unable to paper over the problems inherent in optical scan voting systems, as with all software-driven election systems.


Just having paper ballots isn't enough; how it’s counted matters.


* I testified in court that our signature count differed from the official report of vote totals in 68% of the precincts we audited. (We audited 1/4 of all precincts in the Franklin County, Ohio November 2006 election.)

In collecting forensic data, we found one column in the signature books which contained marks by pollworkers that each represented different information. When reviewing what my team of auditors had reported for these differing marks, I realized the entire column of "provisional" votes had to be removed from my analysis because of potentially inconsistent interpretation by my auditors.

For example, pollworkers marked the "provisional" vote column on Election Day to note if a voter voted provisionally, or if a voter voted Absentee (whether or not he or she showed up at the polls that day). This conflict in how pollworkers marked the column provided another level of inconsistency in the forensic records which rendered this column useless in performing our audit.

When I prepared the spreadsheet of our findings for court, I created two analysis columns - one which used the "provisional" vote column from the pollbooks and one which used official reports of how many voters had voted provisionally.

When using the second analysis - which compared the number of signatures of those who arrived on Election Day and voted in person PLUS the number of provisional voters as reported by the Franklin County Board of Elections, our audit revealed that official numbers conflicted with the audit in 24% of the precincts.

This second analysis is the most conservative estimate of how far off official results are as compared to the paper records, and is stunning in light of BOE Director Matt Damschroder's testimony that he had less than 1% error rate in this election.

e-Voting Recount Tips

The below How-To list was sent on February 18th to some election activists who want to post a general How-To manual for citizens.

These tips apply to “recounting” a voter verified paper audit trail, but many ideas transfer over to a recount actual paper ballots marked by voters.

Registration List

In advance of an anticipated recount, request the list of registered voters for that county, for the period after registration closed and before the election. (If your election district allows same-day registration, request the final list as created on Election Day.)

For longer term activists, request the list of registered voters several months in advance of the November election, as well. Request the lists at two or three points throughout the year to study purge patterns (where election officials remove voters from the rolls).

How is the selection of precincts to be determined? Is this a random selection? If so, describe how the precincts to be recounted were randomly selected. Did you observe this process or was it done out of your sight? Note this in your report.

Some recounts may target specific precincts to be recounted, at the discretion of the contestant. Find out the criteria for how these targeted precincts were selected (if possible) and note that in your report.

Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail a.k.a. Real Time Audit Log

What is being “recounted” is the voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT), also known as the Real Time Audit Log (RTAL). This intact singular roll of paper shows:

when the machine was turned on (date and time),
the results of the Audit and Logic tests,
any “password overrides” and other messages produced throughout the day,
the actual ballot choices of each individual voter, in the order voted,
when they “closed out the machine” and
totals of that machine for the day are printed.

This singular intact roll of paper – that can be 300 feet long – will also record “service menu entered” or other indication of technician involvement.

There is one VVPAT per machine, but there can be several machines per precinct.

Create Your Recount Form in Advance

Bring pre-printed forms on which to note specific data and vote totals. These forms are where your totals are recorded, and are separate from your tally sheets.

Touchscreens that use a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT), sometimes called a real time audit log (RTAL), produce a thermal paper roll that can be up to 300 feet long. This records all the ballot selections by each voter who voted on that particular machine. Be sure you are close enough to read it, as the print is very tiny. Look for and note:

Precinct number

Date of recount

Names of all present (and their position, if officials)

Machine number (there may be from one to several machines per precinct). On an ES&S iVotronic touch screen system, also note:

· Does the “public count” read zero at the beginning of the tape
· Note the “protective” or “protected” count at the beginning of the tape
· Note the “protective” or “protected” count at the end of the tape
· Note the number of “coded ballots” also known a provisional votes

Candidate names, with space for

· Number of in-person votes
· Number of provisional votes (or “coded” ballots)
· Number of undervotes

Is the VVPAT torn or incomplete? Has it been taped? Is it written on? Below is a list of problems previously observed on an ES&S iVotronic touch screen:

· paper jams
· no vote recorded (tape says “not opened”)
· not used (reported by Board of Elections)
· one vote recorded
· torn tapes
· “PEB not accessed” (Precinct Electronic Ballot is plugged into each machine for that precinct and downloads the vote totals)
· blank roll of paper
· roll reversed (which means the roll has been viewed, and rewound backwards)
· rolls are not signed and dated by pollworkers
· password override message

Look for computer generated warnings that are printed on the VVPAT which indicate the machine was accessed during Election Day, a password was changed, machine improperly shut down, etc. Photocopy or photograph these VVPATs, or if that is not possible, write down the entire warning message.

Is there a large space between voters? The spacing should be even between voters. Note which machine exhibits this on its roll, and how often it occurs on a given roll.

Note unusual voting patters of a given voter. For example, in the November 2006 recount in Franklin County, Ohio, one ballot I observed showed a vote for Green Party candidate, Bob Fitrakis, for governor, all other selections were for Democrats, and for the hotly contested U.S. Congressional seat, the voter supposedly chose conservative Republican Deborah Pryce.

Tally Sheets – Use Lined Paper

Two tally methods are offered:

Hash marks of four //// can be crossed with diagonal hash mark so that each block of hash marks represents 5 votes, making it easy to total by counting by five.

The dot tally method uses far less space, and gives blocks of 10, which is even easier to total than blocks of five. This is a preferred method when counting large numbers of objects like ballots, but it does take a little explanation.

Mark a dot in each corner of a square (that would be four votes). Connect the dots to form the square (another four votes). Put an X thru the middle of the square (another two votes).
This represents ten votes:

Each dot or line represents one vote:
[ dot tally pictures did not transfer into this post]

In less space than it takes to make five hash marks, a block of ten is recorded using the dot tally method, and it is much neater and thus easier to count correctly.

Tally Order

Richard Hayes Phillips suggests the following order of tallying, which will expose ballot tampering (high number of consecutive ballots for the same candidate).

Using lined paper for your tally sheets, write the name of the candidate first called out and give that vote a hash mark (or a dot, if using the dot tally method). Continue recording consecutive candidate choices on the same line (and continuing onto the next line if necessary).

When a different candidate name is called out, write that candidate’s name on the next line and begin marking. Again, continue recording consecutive candidate choices on the same line.

Repeat this process throughout. When finished, you should be able to visually ascertain if an unusually high number of consecutive votes for a particular candidate occurred.

Signature Audit

(I have a couple pages of tips, but I have to distill this from a 10-page report. I’ll wait to see if you want this level of detail.)